Graham v. Sheriff of Logan County: Coercion in Rape and the Plight of Women Prisoners by Seddiqui, Kristen
Denver Law Review 
Volume 92 
Issue 3 Tenth Circuit Survey Article 9 
December 2020 
Graham v. Sheriff of Logan County: Coercion in Rape and the 
Plight of Women Prisoners 
Kristen Seddiqui 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr 
Recommended Citation 
Kristen Seddiqui, Graham v. Sheriff of Logan County: Coercion in Rape and the Plight of Women Prisoners, 
92 Denv. U. L. Rev. 671 (2015). 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion 
in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact 
jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 
GRAHAM V. SHERIFF OF LOGAN COUNTY: COERCION IN
RAPE AND THE PLIGHT OF WOMEN PRISONERS
ABSTRACT
Sex between a prison guard and a prison inmate is usually consid-
ered rape, and is thus adjudicated as an Eighth Amendment excessive
force claim. When the Tenth Circuit heard Graham v. Sheriff of Logan
County, it was tasked with determining whether sex between a prison
inmate and two guards constituted excessive force, but instead, the court
ignored the issue of force and improperly held that the female inmate
consented to intercourse.
This Comment utilizes feminist dominance theory as a backdrop for
analyzing the Tenth Circuit's discussion of whether Stacey Graham was
raped by two prison guards. Dominance theory argues that, in criminal
rape, gender inequality is a form of coercion. However, gender inequality
is also greatly relevant when evaluating rape as an Eighth Amendment
violation. Instead of recognizing the extreme inequality and gender
asymmetry that exists between male guards and female inmates in pris-
on, the Tenth Circuit bestowed the power of consent upon the inmate-
plaintiff in Graham and insisted that she had the voluntary right and abil-
ity to consent to intercourse with a male guard. By disregarding the pow-
er imbalance the prison created and discounting the role of both gender
and social inequality, the Tenth Circuit's decision subordinates female
prisoners who seek justice as victims of rape.
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INTRODUCTION
Under law, rape is a sex crime that is not regarded as a crime
when it looks like sex.
-Catherine MacKinnon'
Under the traditional view of rape, criminal law requires inter-
course, coercion, and nonconsent. This three-pronged requirement as-
sumes that women can consent to forced sex.3 What traditional rape law
neglects to consider, however, is that force can transcend physical ag-
gression; a woman's failure to display physical resistance to force is not
indicative of consent.4
1. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 172 (1989).
2. Id.
3. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, WOMEN'S LIVES, MEN'S LAWS 131 (2005); see also infra
Part I.B.
4. See, e.g., State v. Robinson, 496 A.2d 1067, 1069 (Me. 1985), in which a jury questioned
whether rape could occur post-penetration, to which the judge affirmed that "intercourse by compul-
sion" constitutes rape. The trial court continued, stating that "[t]he critical element there is the con-
tinuation under compulsion." Id. Thus, rape occurs based on compulsion, not necessarily based on a
victim's physical displays of resistance to the offense. Id.
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Feminist legal scholars find the deficiencies of rape law indicative
of social inequality between men and women.' Gender asymmetry is
exacerbated in prison where male guards have complete control over
female inmates.6 Under such circumstances, when rape occurs between a
male guard and female inmate, the inmate is subordinated and powerless
not only based on her gender, but further by her status as a prisoner.
In Graham v. Sheriff of Logan County, Stacey Graham was a pris-
oner who claimed her male guards raped her in violation of the Eighth
Amendment, which protects prisoners from cruel and unusual punish-
8ment. The Tenth Circuit focused on the evidence of her consent to sex,
holding that rape did not occur.9 Though federal courts are split as to
what constitutes consent to sex between prisoners and their guards, and
whether consent may exist at all,'0 the Tenth Circuit's treatment of the
matter disregarded both the power dynamic and gender asymmetry be-
tween female inmates and male guards, and the issue of evaluating force
in rape. This Comment discusses how inequality is a form of coercion in
rape and how the Tenth Circuit's decision in Graham subordinates wom-
5. Many consider traditional rape law, as with other laws, a reflection of patriarchal society.
See infra notes 51-52 (describing patriarchy and its impact). The legal system is among the institu-
tions in society affected by patriarchy. Additionally, when the legal system must evaluate allegations
of rape, its evaluation of consent exemplifies the social inequality embedded in our society:
In determining "consent," as in making judgments about force, fear, intimidation, and
"reasonableness," law's vague, abstract standards are especially troubling in this respect.
Law has not simply opted for a neutral solution to these socially contested issues. In each
instance, law has chosen sides. The law gives priority to the interest (the predominantly
male interest) in seeking sexual gratification through advances backed by physical
strength and social power. And the law gives priority to protecting sexually assertive in-
dividuals (predominantly men) from the risk of conviction without clear warning in ad-
vance.
STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX: THE CULTURE OF INTIMIDATION AND THE FAILURE OF
LAw 67 (1998); see also NANCY LEVIT & ROBERT R.M. VERCHICK, FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 10
(2006) (noting that "[d]ominance theorists cite the lack of legal controls on pornography and sexual
harassment, excessive restrictions on abortion, and inadequate responses to violence against women
as examples of the ways laws contribute to the oppression of women").
6. "Gender asymmetry" refers to the disproportional imbalance of equality between genders.
7. 741 F.3d 1118 (10th Cir. 2013).
8. Id. at 1124. The Eighth Amendment states, "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
See Giron v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 191 F.3d 1281, 1290 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that sexual abuse of
an inmate by an officer is an Eighth Amendment violation); Graham v. Sheriff of Logan Cnty., No.
CIV-10-1048-F, 2012 WL 9509373, at *6 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 1, 2012) (noting that "[b]ecause Gra-
ham was incarcerated at the time of the alleged events . . . her claim is properly analyzed as an
Eighth Amendment excessive force claim"); Fisher v. Goord, 981 F. Supp. 140, 172 (W.D.N.Y.
1997) ("Sexual abuse may violate contemporary standards of decency and can cause severe physical
and psychological harm. For this reason . . . sexual abuse of an inmate by a prison official can ...
constitute an Eighth Amendment violation."); infra notes 47-48, 120-21 and accompanying text; cf
Women Prisoners of D.C. Dep't of Corr. v. District of Columbia, 877 F. Supp. 634, 665 (D.D.C.
1994) (stating that rape is "simply not part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offens-
es against society" (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
9. Graham, 741 F.3d at 1124.
10. See infra Part II.C.
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en prisoners in the justice system by misapplying the law and failing to
recognize the social constructs of gender in prison.
This Comment proceeds in three parts. Part I provides a background
of postmodern dominance theory to explain how rape is a byproduct of
institutionalized gender inequality. Further, by discussing how gender
inequality is coupled with severe power dynamics in a restricted envi-
ronment, Part I also demonstrates how the power imbalance is manifest-
ed in prison. Part II outlines the facts, procedural history, and unanimous
majority opinion of Graham. Finally, Part III draws on the concepts of
dominance theory to show how the Tenth Circuit improperly reviewed
the issue of consent and to analyze how inequality between Graham and
two guards functioned as a form of coercion to sex. Part III concludes by
expanding the concepts of gender inequality to consider how Graham
commoditized her sexuality in prison as a result of her extreme power-
lessness.
I. BACKGROUND
Knowledge of the social environment that a prison creates is critical
to understanding whether an inmate can consent to sexual behavior in
prison. Thus, this Part begins by establishing how prisons create a
framework in which inmates have little control over their lives, and con-
siders the ways in which inmates respond to that lack of control. This
Part continues with a background to distinguish rape law as a constitu-
tional violation from rape law in the criminal context and concludes with
a brief introduction of feminist legal theory to analyze how existing rape
law is grounded in patriarchy, a social structure that is exacerbated in
prison.
A. The Social Framework ofPrison and the Inmate Response
When an inmate is admitted to prison, she must adjust to an envi-
ronment where she faces high threat but lacks control." Such an adjust-
ment can result in severe psychological damage.12 Prisoners respond to
the lack of control in several ways, one of which is to suppress emotions
and vulnerabilities to convince others that they are violent.' 3 Despite
suppressing emotion outwardly, one study revealed that internally, wom-
11. Craig Haney, Psychology and the Limits to Prison Pain: Confronting the Coming Crisis in
Eighth Amendment Law, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 499, 535 (1997).
12. Id.; Barbara H. Zaitzow, Pastel Fascism: Reflections of Social Control Techniques Used
with Women in Prison, 32 WOMEN'S STUD. Q. 33, 40 (2004) ("A woman inmate's feeling of inade-
quacy is heightened by the constant surveillance under which she is kept. The prisoner is confronted
daily with the fact that she has been stripped of her membership in society at large, and then stands
condemned as an outcast and outlaw such that she must be kept closely guarded and watched day
and night. She loses the privilege of being trusted and her every act is viewed with suspicion by the
guards.").
13. Haney, supra note 11, at 536-37 (citing prisoner research).
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en inmates experience stages of grief comparable to those experienced by
terminally ill patients.14
Beginning with denial, both patients and prisoners experience anger
when they realize that they are no longer in control of their lives.'5 Be-
cause of the lack of control, the anger women experience during this
stage is expressed through an increased need for self-assertion.16 One
way prisoners attempt to exercise control is by playing a game known as
"being sneaky" in which they deceive guards to make them believe the
women are doing what the guards want them to do.'7 Making a decision
is deemed a luxury in prison; thus, the mere ability to decide when to
play this game itself serves as an exercise of control.'8 As this Comment
will show, the plaintiff in Graham often determined the amount and ex-
tent of inappropriate contact with her guards, which is reflective of her
struggle for control as an inmate.'9
While prisoners must cope to adapt to the psychological struggles of
incarceration, prison guards present a separate but related challenge.
Guards have nearly complete control within prisons, which allows them
to exploit the power imbalance with inmates.20 While in a free society, a
woman can respond to harassment or abuse, in prison, inmates are forced
to tolerate their guards' abuse because they depend on the guards for
safety.21 For example, inmates rely on guards for basic needs,22 and
14. Christina Jose-Kampfner, Coming to Terms with Existential Death: An Analysis of Wom-
en's Adaptation to Life in Prison, 17 SOc. JUST. 110, I12-13 (1990).
15. Id at 115.
16. Id. at 115-16 (quoting a study in which a researcher notes that, similar to the ways in
which a dying patient yearns for control over their medication and food, an inmate searches for ways
to assert control over basic facets of her own life).
17. Id at 116-17 (explaining that inmates play the game of "being sneaky" in how they
respond to officers' orders; for example, if an officer punishes an inmate by forcing her to eat food
in her cell, the inmate seeks to make the officer believe she prefers eating in her cell instead of the
dining room).
18. Id.
19. The game is not more than a response to complete powerlessness. It is not necessarily
indicative of an inmate's desires or wants; rather, it is a mind game by which the prisoner experienc-
es some level of control over her own acts and, in turn, the acts of others. By "being sneaky," wom-
en deceive guards and encounter a minute fraction of control in an environment that otherwise re-
stricts their behavior. See id.
20. See Danielle Dirks, Sexual Revictimization and Retraumatization of Women in Prison, 32
WOMEN'S STUD. Q. 102, 107 (2004) (citing AMNESTY INT'L, "NOT PART OF MY SENTENCE":
VIOLATIONS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN IN CUSTODY 7 (1999), available at
https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/amr51/019/1999/en/; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ALL Too
FAMILIAR: SEXUAL ABUSE OF WOMEN IN U.S. STATE PRISONS 43, 75 (1996), available at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1996/12/01/all-too-familiar) ("Correctional officers' absolute power
over giving warnings, infractions, and punitive measures may provide opportunities for the devel-
opment of exploitative relationships that hinge on 'favor-giving' and avoiding punishment.");
Anthea Dinos, Note, Custodial Sexual Abuse: Enforcing Long-Awaited Policies Designed to Protect
Female Prisoners, 45 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 281, 282 (2001).
21. Katherine C. Parker, Note, Female Inmates Living in Fear: Sexual Abuse by Correctional
Officers in the District of Columbia, 10 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 443, 444 (2002).
22. Zaitzow, supra note 12, at 39-40 ("The most obvious fact of life in women's prisons is
that women are dependent on the officers for virtually every daily necessity, including food, show-
ers, medical care, feminine hygiene products, and for receiving 'privileges' such as phone calls,
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guards take advantage of that by often withholding goods and privileges
to punish or compel behavior.23
Regardless of whether a guard actually withholds a prisoner's privi-
leges, a guard's mere power to do so presents the same threat. Women
inmates face both implicit and explicit threats if they disobey a guard's
sexual advances.24 Moreover, inmates may become emotionally attached
to guards and find that sex with a guard is an opportunity to experience
power and control.25 Because a woman inmate faces complete power-
lessness in prison, the decision to use her body as a commodity or trade
sex for favors is an opportunity to exercise control.2 6 In addition, because
prisoners tend to have experienced physical or sexual abuse in past rela-
tionships, the power imbalance between inmates and guards often feels
familiar and normal.27 Prior victimization increases the likelihood that an
inmate is influenced by a guard's control.28
In defining what constitutes legal and illegal force in sex, existing
criminal rape law has established what is considered a "normal level of
force." 29 By placing value on a male defendant's view of what consti-
tutes rape, criminal law reflects the inequality between men and women,
the role of patriarchy, and the legal subordination of women. The Tenth
Circuit's analysis in Graham exemplifies this view, while reflecting the
legal system's disregard for both the powerlessness of women prisoners
and the social environment prison creates, where gender inequality is
treated as an irrelevant factor to inmates.
B. The Criminal and Constitutional Violation ofRape
The crime of rape in the United States was originally adopted from
English common law, which required use of force and lack of consent.
30
mail, visits, and attending programs. To ask another adult for permission to do things or to obtain
items of a personal nature is demeaning and humiliating.... The women prisoners, like children, are
told when to get up, how to dress, what to eat, where to go, how to spend their time-in short, what
to do and what not to do.").
23. Dinos, supra note 20, at 283.
24. See Kim Shayo Buchanan, Note, Impunity. Sexual Abuse in Women's Prisons, 42 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 45, 56 (2007).
25. Id. at 67 (discussing a Rathbone study that discussed a prisoner who had sex with guards
and reported that it gave her a sense of power).
26. Id. at 57 (noting that power dynamics in prison are based on the dichotomy between those
in power (the prison guards) and those without power (the inmates)). Such powerlessness "serves as
a constant reminder to women in prison that they do not have autonomy over their own bodies or
well-being in prison," and that power and gender imbalance in prison is exacerbated by the control
male correctional officers have "as women must rely on men for basic necessities, phone privileges,
and visiting privileges." Dirks, supra note 20, at 106-07; see also supra notes 21-23.
27. Buchanan, supra note 24, at 56; Dirks, supra note 20, at 110 ("Women who have had
previous experiences of victimization in their lifetimes are more likely to have repeated experiences
of trauma in their lives.").
28. Dinos, supra note 20, at 283.
29. MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 173.
30. Cynthia Ann Wicktom, Note, Focusing on the Offender's Forceful Conduct: A Proposal
for the Redefinition of Rape Laws, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 399, 401 (1988). Rape was initially
[Vol. 92:3676
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However, in determining what constitutes rape, different courts applied
varied standards for the amount of force required and the necessary
amount of resistance by the victim. 31 As rape law in the United States
developed, state legislatures defined rape differently; while some focused
on the element of nonconsent, others focused on requisite force.32
The traditional, criminal law view that rape requires intercourse,
force, and nonconsent assumes that if sexual behavior involves two of
the three elements, it would not constitute rape. For example, force dur-
ing intercourse could be considered consensual, or nonconsensual inter-
course could be acceptable absent force or coercion. 33 The existing laws
imply that women may consent to forced sex.34 By assuming this per-
spective, criminal law reveals the value of male dominance and the de-
graded status of both women themselves and their social worth. While
the law seeks to treat men and women equally, it arguably fails to realize
social inequality between genders.
When requiring both physical force and nonconsent, the legal sys-
tem suggests that nonconsensual sex is not rape or that forced sex may be
consensual.36 The Model Penal Code, which is among the leading rape
reforms, defines rape as sexual intercourse that is compelled by either
force, the threat of force, serious bodily injury, or extreme pain.7 The
Model Penal Code eliminates nonconsent as long as there is coercion.38
While some states have followed the Model Penal Code's example by
including coercion in their definition of force, the meaning of coercion
has varied among jurisdictions.39
While the crime of rape is often adjudicated as a criminal offense,
rape that occurs in prison may amount to a constitutional violation. A
prisoner's treatment and the conditions of a prisoner's confinement must
conform with the Eighth Amendment,40 which states, "[e]xcessive bail
shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
defined as "the carnal knowledge of a woman forcibly and against her will." Id. at 401 n.16 (citing 4
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *210).
31. Timothy W. Murphy, A Matter of Force: The Redefinition of Rape, 39 A.F. L. REV. 19,
19-20 (1996).
32. Michal Buchhandler-Raphael, The Failure of Consent: Re-Conceptualizing Rape as
Sexual Abuse ofPower, 18 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 147, 150 (2011); see also Ann T. Spence, Note, A
Contract Reading of Rape Law: Redefining Force to Include Coercion, 37 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PROBS. 57, 58-59 (2003) (discussing the various approaches states u e to evaluate rape claims).
33. MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 172.
34. MACKINNON, supra note 3, at 131.
35. Id. at 129 ("Availability for aggressive intimate intrusion and use at will for pleasure by
another defines who one is socially taken to be and constitutes an index of social worth.").
36. Spence, supra note 32, at 62 (citing examples).
37. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1(1)(a).
38. Murphy, supra note 31, at 20.
39. Spence, supra note 32, at 64-65.
40. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quoting Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25,
31 (1993)).
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punishments inflicted."4 1 Asserting that rape in prison violates the Eighth
Amendment is an allegation of cruel and unusual punishment.
For sexual misconduct in prison, the Supreme Court's ruling in
Farmer v. Brennan42 defines the prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment.4 3 In Farmer, the transsexual plaintiff claimed prison offi-
cials violated his Eighth Amendment rights by placing him in a male
prison where he was beaten and raped." The Court reasoned that while
the Eighth Amendment prohibits prison officials from using excessive
physical force against prisoners, it also imposes a duty on officials to
ensure the safety of prisoners and that they are treated humanely.45 To
that end, the Supreme Court held that sexual abuse of a prison inmate by
a prison official constitutes an Eighth Amendment violation.46
However, to distinguish any injury a prisoner may sustain in prison
from being a constitutional violation, the Supreme Court has determined
that an offense must meet both an objective and subjective element to
amount to an Eighth Amendment violation.47 To satisfy the objective
element, a court must first decide whether the alleged harm was objec-
tively serious enough to establish a violation.4 8 For the subjective ele-
ment, a court must find that the prison official had a culpable state of
mind, defined as a "'deliberate indifference' to inmate safety."4 9 While a
rape allegation under the Eighth Amendment must satisfy the elements
required under a criminal rape claim, i.e., sexual contact, nonconsent,
and force, it is evaluated narrowly to also meet the requirements of a
constitutional violation.
C. Gender Inequality and Existing Rape Law
Some feminist theories hold that, because so much of our legal sys-
tem and rules of civilization have been written by men, men exercise
more control in society than women.5 0 Postmodern feminist legal theory
41. U.S. CONST. amend. ViII.
42. 511 U.S. 825 (1994).
43. Cheryl Bell et al., Recent Developments, Rape and Sexual Misconduct in the Prison
System: Analyzing America's Most "Open" Secret, 18 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 195, 211 (1999).
44. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 830; see also Cheryl Bell et al., supra note 43.
45. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832.
46. Id. at 834 ("Being violently assaulted in prison is simply not 'part of the penalty that
criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society."' (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S.
337, 347 (1981))); see also Giron v. Corrs. Corp. of Am., 191 F.3d 1281, 1290 (10th Cir. 1999)
(citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834).
47. Bell et al., supra note 43, at 212.
48. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.
49. Id. at 834-35 (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 302-03 (1991)).
50. LEVIT & VERCHICK, supra note 5, at 15-16 ("All feminist theories share two things . ...
First, feminists recognize that the world has been shaped by men, particularly white men, who for
this reason possess larger shares of power and privilege. All feminist legal scholars emphasize the
rather obvious (but unspoken) point that nearly all public laws in the history of existing civilization
were written by men.. . . Second, all feminists believe that women and men should have political,
social, and economic equality. But while feminists agree on the goal of equality, they disagree about
its meaning and on how to achieve it."). Levit and Verchick continue to describe various feminist
678 [Vol. 92:3
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considers men's legacy of control as the basis for our society's patriar-
chal structure-which is manifested in the law's subordinate treatment of
women who have been sexually violated through male dominance.5'
Dominance theory finds that sexual violation is made possible by
gender inequality.52 Gender inequality is socially institutionalized and
demonstrates the subordination of women. For example, Catharine
MacKinnon, a prominent feminist legal theorist, postulates that sexual
assault occurs because of a hierarchy between the parties to the assault-
in other words, the power of one gender over another.54 A hierarchy ex-
isted in Graham not only because the plaintiff was a woman, but also
because she was a prisoner, and the perpetrators were her male guards.
Nevertheless, awareness of a social hierarchy is seemingly absent in
rape law where force is characterized by male dominance.5 The defense
of consent, for example, is focused on the defendant's belief of what a
woman wanted, as opposed to the woman's understanding of the inci-
dent, which demonstrates the hierarchy between genders.56 By discredit-
ing the experience of the woman victim, rape law reflects how women
legal theories, including equal treatment theory, which is "based on the principle of formal equality.
. . namely, that women are entitled to the same rights as men," id at 16; cultural feminism, which
"argues that formal equality does not always result in substantive equality," id. at 18; dominance
theory, which "focuses on the power relations between men and women," id at 22; critical race
feminism, which "argue[s] that legal doctrines in various areas, such as rape, sexual harassment, and
domestic violence, do not adequately address discrimination based on the intersections of these
categories," id. at 26; and additional theories, including lesbian feminism, ecofeminism, pragmatic
feminism, and postmodem feminism, id. at 29-36.
51. Id. at 23 ("Patriarchy means the rule or 'power of the fathers.' It is a system of social and
political practices in which men subordinate and exploit women. The subordination occurs through
complex patterns of force, social pressures, and traditions, rituals, and customs. This domination
does not just occur in individual relationships, but is supported by the major institutions in society.").
52. See MACKINNON, supra note 3, 127-29. Catharine MacKinnon first introduced this par-
ticular postmodem view in 1979. LEVIT & VERCHICK, supra note 5, at 22. Dominance theory argues
that women are subordinated due to "patterns of male domination" that have resulted from our
culture and social institutions, thus reinforcing patriarchy. Id. at 22-23.
53. LEVIT & VERCHICK, supra note 5, at 22-23.
54. MACKINNON, supra note 3, at 246. For this reason, MacKinnon writes that rape is "a
crime of sexualized dominance on the basis of sex." Id.
55. Id at 244.
56. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 842 (1990).
In her article, Bartlett describes "the woman question," which is a method of exposing how the law
subordinates women by "examining how the law fails to take into account the experiences and
values that seem more typical of women than of men . .. or how existing legal standards and con-
cepts might disadvantage women." Id at 837 (internal quotation marks omitted). Bartlett points out
that asking the woman question reveals that "the defense of consent focuses on the perspective of the
defendant and what he 'reasonably' thought the woman wanted, rather than the perspective of the
woman and the intentions she 'reasonably' thought she conveyed to the defendant," and such
scrutiny reveals how the legal system subordinates women; thus, "the woman question helps to
demonstrate how social structures embody norms that implicitly render women different and thereby
subordinate." Id. at 842-43. In Graham, the court emphasized the defendants' impressions of con-
sent rather than scrutinizing the intent of the victim. See Graham v. Sheriff of Logan Cnty., 741 F.3d
1118, 1123 (10th Cir. 2013).
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are devalued in society.57 Dominance theory adopts the view that force
sufficient to overcome consent may transcend physical acts and include
both nonphysical domination and psychological abuse.8 The evidence
presented in Graham exemplifies the need for courts to consider the
dominance theory view that coercion can exist absent physical force.
II. GRAHAM V. SHERIFF OF LOGAN COUNTY
A. Facts
While Stacey Graham was imprisoned in solitary confinement at the
Logan County Jail in Oklahoma, Rahmel Jefferies and Alexander Men-
dez, who were both prison guards, engaged in sexual intercourse with
her.59 While the intercourse was an isolated occurrence, both Jefferies
and Mendez had separately associated with Graham beyond what is typi-
cal of a prison guard and an inmate.so
The relationship between Graham and Jefferies evolved over time.6 1
The jail intercom system allowed a guard in a control tower to communi-
cate with a prisoner in her cell, and Jefferies used the intercom system to
have ongoing conversations with Graham.62 Their conversations devel-
oped from discussing their families and interests to discussing sexual
intercourse; eventually, the two also exchanged sexual notes.63 At one
point, Graham flashed her breasts at Jefferies; and on other occasions,
Jefferies provided Graham with a candy bar and a blanket at her re-
quest.M
Graham's relationship with Mendez, on the other hand, was much
more brief-it was limited to a matter of days before their sexual en-
counter.65 A few weeks after Graham and Jefferies began communicating
over the intercom, Mendez used the same intercom to initiate a conversa-
tion with Graham; he began to discuss his sexual fantasies and inquire
66about hers. It was during that conversation that Graham told Mendez
she wanted to "be with two men at the same time." 67 During that conver-
sation, Mendez asked if he could look at Graham naked through the win-
dow of her cell, and she complied.68
57. Bartlett, supra note 56, 842-43 ("[Rape law] reveals how the position of women reflects
the organization of society," thereby exposing "how social structures embody norms that implicitly
render women different and thereby subordinate.").
58. LEVIT & VERCHICK, supra note 5, at 180.
59. Graham, 741 F.3d at 1120.
60. Id. at 1120-21.
61. See id.





67. Id. (quoting Graham in the record).
68. Id.
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That night, Mendez brought Jefferies to Graham's cell and the three
engaged in sexual conduct.69 Graham and Jefferies had intercourse while
Graham "simultaneously performed oral sex on Mendez."70 Jefferies and
Mendez then switched positions.71 While Mendez was trying to have sex
with her, he dropped his radio.72 Graham attempted to stand up when the
radio dropped, but Mendez pushed her head back down toward Jefferies
as he muttered a profanity toward Graham. When Graham heard anoth-
er female inmate get up and a coughing noise, Jefferies and Mendez im-
mediately left Graham's cell.74
The next day a jail administrator questioned Graham, Mendez, and
Jefferies, but all three denied inappropriate contact. A few weeks later,
however, Graham confessed about the incident to the jail administrator,
though she stated that intercourse was consensual. During the resulting
investigation, Jefferies and Mendez both admitted to the incident and
were terminated from their positions.77 Thereafter, Graham was trans-
ferred to another prison, where she displayed signs of depression, post-
traumatic stress disorder, and received psychological care, noting to a
psychologist that "she had been raped by two jailers."78
B. Procedural History
On September 24, 2010, Graham filed suit for relief under 42
U.S.C. § 198379 claiming that Jefferies and Mendez's acts violated both
her Eighth8o and Fourteenth81 Amendment rights, and that the Sheriff of
Logan County "fail[ed] to discipline, supervise, and train" both Jefferies
and Mendez.82 The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Okla-




72. Graham v. Sheriff of Logan Cnty., No. CIV-10-1048-F, 2012 WL 9509373, at *4 (W.D.
Okla. Nov. 1, 2012), affd741 F.3d 1118 (10th Cir. 2013).
73. Id.
74. Graham, 741 F.3d at 1121.
75. Id at 1121-22.
76. Id at 1122.
77. Id
78. Id; Appellant's Opening Brief at 9, Graham, 741 F.3d 1118 (No. 12-6302).
79. See Procedural Means of Enforcement Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 40 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV.
CRIM. PROC. 1058, 1059 (2011) (describing how 42 U.S.C. § 1983 enables a prisoner to "seek re-
dress when a person acting under color of state law deprives the prisoner of rights guaranteed by the
Constitution" (footnote omitted)).
80. For a brief overview of the Eighth Amendment, see supra note 8 and accompanying text;
see also Brittany Glidden, Necessary Suffering?: Weighing Government and Prisoner Interests in
Determining What Is Cruel and Unusual, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1815, 1818-21 (2012) (describing
that the Supreme Court has interpreted the Eighth Amendment as a means for prisoners to challenge
their confinement while in custody, and to do so they must establish both the objective and subjec-
tive prong of an excessive force claim).
81. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (stating that a State shall not "deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of the law").
82. Graham, 741 F.3d at 1122.
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Eighth Amendment.8 3 The District Court granted summary judgment for
the defendants, stating there was no Eighth Amendment violation be-
cause the sexual activity was consensual.84
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
affirmed the district court's decision.85 The court found that summary
judgment was proper because there was no dispute as to any material
fact, since Graham was not forced to have sex.86 While the court stated
that "Graham's focus on appeal is . . . whether a prisoner can legally
consent to sex" with a guard, the opinion notes that some form of coer-
cion is required.87 However, based on "the overwhelming evidence of
consent," the court held that there was no Eighth Amendment violation.88
C. Majority Opinion
In a unanimous decision, the Tenth Circuit was convinced that Gra-
ham had consented to sexual activity and that her consent negated the
claim of an Eighth Amendment violation.89 When the court considered
whether Graham presented a question of fact, it weighed the issue of
consent against what would constitute an excessive force violation of the
Eighth Amendment.90
First, the court briefly reviewed the two prongs of an excessive
force claim-one objective, the other subjective.9 1 The objective prong
looks at whether the "alleged wrongdoing was objectively harmful
enough to establish a constitutional violation," focusing on the nature of
force used.92 The subjective prong looks at the mens rea of the offender,
under which Graham would need to show that the guards acted with a
culpable state of mind, used force "maliciously and sadistically," and
intended to cause the harm.93 Without applying facts to either prong, the
court quickly assessed that because Graham was not forced to have sex,
"all other issues [are] irrelevant."94
83. Graham v. Sheriff of Logan Cnty., No. CIV-10-1048-F, 2012 WL 9509373, at *6 (W.D.
Okla. Nov. 1, 2012) ("Because Graham was incarcerated at the time of the alleged events, the court
concludes that her claim is properly analyzed as an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim."
(discussing Smith v. Cochran, 339 F.3d 1205, 1210 n.2 (10th Cir. 2003))), affd741 F.3d 1118 (10th
Cir. 2013).
84. Graham, 741 F.3d at 1122; see also Graham, 2012 WL 9509373, at *9 (noting "the con-
sensual sexual activity at issue in this case does not give rise to a violation of Graham's Eighth
Amendment rights"). The court reasoned that pushing Graham's head down did not amount to ex-
cessive force. Id. at *9 n.4 (citing Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1992)).
85. Graham, 741 F.3d at 1122.
86. Id. at 1123.
87. Id. at 1124-25.
88. Id. at 1126.
89. Id.
90. See id at 1123.
91. Id.
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While Graham relied heavily on the Tenth Circuit's decision in Lo-
bozzo v. Colorado Department of Corrections, the court refused to ap-
ply the case, stating that its unpublished opinion was not binding prece-
dent.96 Nonetheless, the court clarified, "we read [Lobozzo] as saying at
most that the parties agreed that consent was not a defense, a moot point
since the defendants prevailed anyway."97
Because the court neglected the Lobozzo decision, Graham's case
was declared to be a matter of first impression for the Tenth Circuit.98
The court quickly summarized the approaches other courts have taken to
the issue, but greatly emphasized the evidence of Graham's consent
when coming to its holding.99
The Tenth Circuit cited Hall v. Beavin00 and Freitas v. Aultio' when
mentioning that the Sixth and Eighth Circuits held consensual inter-
course could not be an Eighth Amendment violation.102 The Graham
court then noted that lower courts have found "a prison guard has no
consent defense in an Eighth Amendment civil-rights case alleging sexu-
al relations"'03 because any form of sexual activity "serves no legitimate
penalogical [sic] purpose" and is therefore "contrary to the goals of law
enforcement."'04 The court's analysis closed by citing three remaining
cases lower court that found prison guards have no consent defense.'0 5
Before declaring that there is no consensus on whether an inmate
can consent to intercourse, the Tenth Circuit visited the Ninth Circuit's
"middle ground" approach reached in Wood v. Beauclair,106 by which the
Ninth Circuit created "a rebuttable presumption of nonconsent."07
Though the "middle ground" approach offers a presumption of noncon-
sent, the Tenth Circuit's opinion focused on the instances suggesting
Graham's consent. The court reasoned that, even if it adopted the Ninth
Circuit's approach, "the presumption against consent would be overcome
by the overwhelming evidence of consent," and concluded that there was
no Eighth Amendment violation. os
95. 429 F. App'x 707 (10th Cir. 2011). Lobozzo also involved a female inmate who alleged an
Eighth Amendment violation after sexual contact with a male prison guard. See infra Part III.A.2.
96. Graham, 741 F.3d at 1124.
97. Id.
98. Id (noting that, because Lobozzo is not binding, "it is a matter of first impression in this
circuit whether consent can be a defense to an Eighth Amendment claim based on sexual acts"),
99. Id. at 1124-26.
100. No. 98-3803, 1999 WL 1045694 (6th Cir. Nov. 8, 1999).
101. 109 F.3d 1335 (8th Cir. 1997).
102. Graham, 741 F.3d at 1124. See infra Part lI.A.3.
103. Graham, 741 F.3d at 1125 (citing Cash v. Cnty. of Erie, No. 04-CV-0182-JTC(JJM),
2009 WL 3199558, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2009)).
104. Id. at 1125 (quoting Carrigan v. Davis, 70 F. Supp. 2d 448, 454 (D. Del. 1999)).
105. Id. See infra Part 11I.A.3.
106. 692 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2012).
107. Graham, 741 F.3d at 1125 (reviewing Wood, 692 F.3d 1041). See infra Part Il.A.3
108. Graham, 741 F.3d at 1126.
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To explain its decision, the court summarized the instances of Gra-
ham's consent reflected in the record: that she did not contest the prior
sexual conversations; that she told Mendez she desired being with two
men; that she allowed Mendez to look at her naked; and that she did not
resist engaging in the sexual activity.109 The court pointed out that Gra-
ham "stated repeatedly and consistently that almost all of the sexual acts
that occurred were consensual."o10 In fact, because the court found so
many instances of consent, it chose not to explore other potential factors
of the violation,"' noting that they "cannot undermine the other over-
whelming evidence of consent."1 2
The Graham court issued a unanimous decision. Finding that Gra-
ham consented to sexual activity, the court determined that he sexual
incident was not rape.11 3 The court ultimately held that Graham's consent
negated the possibility of an Eighth Amendment violation; thus, it con-
cluded that if there is evidence that an inmate consented to sexual inter-
course, the court will not find a constitutional violation.114
III. ANALYSIS
In Graham, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the plaintiff did not
have an Eighth Amendment claim because she consented to intercourse
with two prison guards..'15 Consent, however, implies a voluntary per-
mission; therefore, to give consent, a person must have free will and be
treated with equality.116 The Graham court disregarded that as a prisoner,
Graham lacked both those things. When the court held that intercourse
was consensual and there was no excessive force, it evaluated the cir-
cumstances of this case based on the laws of a society where all parties
have equal rights, which is contrary to the prison environment.
When evaluating consent to sex, the Graham court did not consider
whether the parties were social equals. As a result, the Tenth Circuit's
decision manifests the ways in which the legal system affirms gender
inequality and limits access to justice for female prisoners. By failing to
review the power dynamic in prison, the court failed to consider the ways
109. Id. at 1123.
110. Id.
111. For example, the court did not discuss whether excessive force occurred, or whether
Graham was coerced.




116. See M. Jackson Jones, Power, Control, Cigarettes, and Gum: Whether an Inmate's Con-
sent to Engage in a Relationship with a Correctional Officer Can be a Defense to the Inmate's
Allegation of a Civil Rights Violation Under the Eighth Amendment, 19 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP.
ADVOC. 275, 306 (2014). Because guards and inmates are in fundamentally unequal positions, where
a guard typically holds most of the power, inmates lack the ability to consent to a sexual relation-
ship. See id. (citing OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DETERRING STAFF SEXUAL
ABUSE OF FEDERAL INMATES 4 (2005), available at
http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/0504/final.pdf).
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in which inequality may function as coercion. As this Part will show, the
Graham court thereby contributed to the legal system's subordination of
women and disregard for female inmates."7
The Tenth Circuit's holding in Graham was ill-considered in three
respects. Because the Tenth Circuit was so focused on whether there was
consent, it failed to consider force. First, this Part begins by reviewing
how the Tenth Circuit misapplied the case law dealing with sexual activi-
ty between prisoners and guards. Second, this Part will discuss how the
Tenth Circuit's decision reflected the legal system's treatment of coer-
cion in rape law. Because it employed a patriarchal definition of consent,
the court ignored how Graham may have been coerced by the inequality
and powerlessness he experienced as a female inmate. Third and finally,
the court's decision treated the parties as equal and disregarded the gen-
der asymmetry between a male prison guard and female prison inmate.
Thus, this section ends by reviewing the power imbalance between male
prison guards and female inmates and discussing how sex is commodi-
tized in prison to postulate why sexual misconduct so frequently occurs.
A. The Tenth Circuit Misapplied the Law in Graham
As it evaluated Graham's excessive force claim, the Tenth Circuit
cursorily examined the legal precedent and improperly focused on con-
sent rather than force. This Subpart argues that Tenth Circuit was so
overwhelmed by the indication of Graham's consent to sex that it misap-
plied the law. First, this Subpart considers how the Tenth Circuit wrong-
ly emphasized what it believed to demonstrate consent. Second, this sub-
part analyzes how the issue of consent drove the Tenth Circuit's disre-
gard for its earlier ruling in Lobozzo. Finally, it concludes by discussing
how the Tenth Circuit's review of existing case law was deficient.
1. The Tenth Circuit's Focus on Consent
Unlike most crimes, rape is one in which the credibility of the vic-
tim is a decisive factor in determining whether any injury occurred."8 In
Graham, the Tenth Circuit focused much of its analysis on Graham's
behavior as evidence of her consent to the sexual activity with Jefferies
and Mendez rather than giving attention to whether any force or coercion
occurred.119 However, rather than focusing on her consent to the act of
sex itself, the court emphasized her behavior before the sexual inci-
dent.120 The court outlined Graham's behavior as evidence of her consent
to sex, and by focusing on her behavior the court both undermined Gra-
ham's credibility as a victim and demonstrated the court's view that she
117. See MACKINNON, supra note 3, at 242.
118. See MACKINNON, supra note 3, at 131.
119. See Graham v. Sheriff of Logan Cnty., 741 F.3d I 18, 1123-24 (10th Cir. 2013).
120. See id.at 1120-21, 1123.
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invited the sexual encounter.121 By doing so, the court essentially sug-
gested that Graham did not experience coercion, but instead invited the
crime she alleged.122
The court began by describing the relationship between Graham and
Jefferies over the intercom system; yet instead of looking at what Jeffer-
ies may have told her, the court focused on what Graham said to him:
"Ms. Graham told Jefferies that she would like a man to make love to
her." 2 3 The opinion continued to explain that Graham and Jefferies ex-
changed sexually explicit notes; yet instead of reviewing what Jefferies
wrote to Graham, the court quoted a note that Graham wrote, but never
gave, to Jefferies.124 The court made a point to state that "[a]lthough the
notes she had previously delivered to Jefferies were less explicit, they
had suggested that she wished to have sexual intercourse with him." 12 5
The court's opinion failed to discuss Graham's interest in the other
guard, Mendez.
Nonetheless, the court continued to justify both Jefferies and Men-
dez's acts by undermining Graham's position as a victim and establish-
ing her consent. The court pointed out that Graham testified "that she
enjoyed the conversations and note-writing," and that it gave her "some-
thing to do." 26 The court also stated that Graham once "flashed her
breasts at Jefferies, although he did not ask her to do so."l27 By high-
lighting that Graham engaged in behavior that was not prompted by Jef-
feries, the court called attention to Graham's responsibility for her ac-
tions and failed to consider how Jefferies may have invited that behav-
ior. 12 8 While the court mentioned Jefferies and Mendez's interaction with
Graham, it failed to acknowledge whether they did anything to compel
Graham's behavior or coerce her to act, except to mention that Jefferies
once gave Graham "a candy bar and a blanket." 29 As a result of disre-
garding any wrongdoing by Mendez or Jefferies, the court allocated re-
sponsibility for any misconduct to Graham.
As the court discussed its reasoning for affirming the lower court, it
shifted from its focus on Graham's behavior before the sexual encounter
and concentrated on her indications of consent at the time of the incident:
"She never told either [Jefferies or Mendez] that she did not want to have
121. See id. at H123-24.
122. Seeid.at1123.
123. Graham, 741 F.3d at 1120.
124. Id. at 1120-21. Both the Circuit Court and the District Court note that Graham and Jef-
fries exchanged notes, but neither court mentions what Jefferies may have written; the courts high-
light only that, in her notes to Jefferies, Graham suggested having sex. See id; Graham v. Sheriff of
Logan Cnty., No. CIV-10-1048-F, 2012 WL 9509373, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 1, 2012).
125. Graham, 741 F.3d at 1121.
126. Id. at 1121 (internal quotation marks omitted).
127. Id. (emphasis added).
128. Id. at 1120-21.
129. Id.atil21.
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sex;',130 "Although she has said that she did not want to have sex with
Mendez[,] ... she has not suggested that she indicated any reluctance to
Jefferies or Mendez;"1'3 "She did nothing to indicate lack of consent
when the guards entered her cell, when they removed her clothing, or
when they touched her. She never told either of them that she did not
want to have sex."l32 Though the court briefly mentioned that Graham
did not want to have sex with Mendez, it continued to hold that Graham
consented because she did not say or do anything to indicate other-
-133
wise.
By first focusing on Graham's earlier behavior, the court justified
Jefferies and Mendez's understanding that the act was consensual. Rather
than analyze Jefferies or Mendez's behavior and the ways in which such
behavior may have coerced Graham, the court discussed Graham's be-
havior prior to the encounter to show that her consent was freely given
during the encounter. After establishing what it found to be evidence of
consent, the Tenth Circuit's quick review of case law shows its eagerness
to conclude there was no violation.
2. The Tenth Circuit's Decision to Ignore Lobozzo
The Tenth Circuit's holding in Lobozzo established that an inmate
could not legally consent to sex with a guard,134 but the Graham court
dismisses that holding by stating, "[U]npublished opinions are not bind-
ing precedent."'3 5 While the court is correct that unpublished opinions
are not binding,136 the failure to consider an unpublished opinion in an in
an area of law that lacks any other precedent is contrary to the doctrine of
precedent. By allowing a judge to review a case with similar facts to a
130. Id. at 1123.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. "Although she has said that she did not want to have sex with Mendez and that Mendez
pushed her head own just before the encounter ended, she has not suggested that she indicated any
reluctance to Jefferies or Mendez." Id.
134. Lobozzo v. Colo. Dep't of Corr., 429 F. App'x 707, 711 (10th Cir. 2011); see also Gra-
ham, 741 F.3d at 1124.
135. Graham, 741 F.3d at 1124; see also Erica S. Weisgerber, Note, Unpublished Opinions: A
Convenient Means to an Unconstitutional End, 97 GEO. L.J. 621, 623 (2009) ("Unpublished opin-
ions are opinions that a court has designated as having non-binding precedential effect. They are
written resolutions to specific cases, prepared exclusively for the involved parties, and they are
intended to have no binding precedential effect-or even persuasive effect, for some jurisdictions-
on future cases." (footnote omitted)).
136. Weisgerber, supra note 135, at 632 ("Even if litigants may now cite to unpublished opin-
ions in their briefs, judges need not accord unpublished cases the same precedential treatment as
published cases, or any precedential treatment at all.").
137. Id. at 632-33 ("This inferior treatment of unpublished opinions is contrary to the role and
understanding of precedent in America's constitutional and legal history."); see also id. at 644 ("[11f
an area of law is unsettled, future cases dealing with the same area of law will surely arise in the
future. If these future cases deal with the same material facts and same legal issues, the prior case
will be on all fours with the subsequent case; in such an instance, the doctrine of precedent demands
that the prior case be binding on the subsequent one.").
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prior decision yet arrive at a separate and distinct conclusion, the judge
may essentially determine which holding becomes law.'38
In Lobozzo, a female inmate had sexual contact with her male pris-
on guard and later alleged an Eighth Amendment violation claiming she
had not been protected against exual assault.13 9 Under the objective el-
ement of an excessive force claim, courts must determine if the wrongdo-
ing was harmful enough to amount to a constitutional violation.14 0 The
Tenth Circuit found that the objective element was satisfied because "[ilt
[was] uncontested that Lobozzo, an inmate, could not legally consent to
sexual activity with . . . a guard" and "rape is sufficiently serious to con-
stitute a constitutional violation."' 4 1 However, while the Tenth Circuit
found that the objective element of the excessive force claim was met, it
did not find the subjective element was satisfied.142
The Tenth Circuit's opinion in Graham neglected to elaborate on
the similarities between Graham's circumstances and those of Loboz-
zo.143 Because Lobozzo held that an inmate cannot consent to sex with a
guard, relying on Lobozzo would have shown that, as a prisoner, Graham
could not consent to intercourse. Just as the objective element of the ex-
cessive force claim was met in Lobozzo, because the inmate and guard
had sexual contact, so too would the same claim be satisfied in Graham,
simply based on Graham's status as a prisoner.
When it disregarded Lobozzo, the Tenth Circuit demonstrated its
struggle in accepting Graham's behavior as a prisoner reacting to a so-
cialized power imbalance;'" instead, the court perceived Graham to be a
woman asking for sex. The Tenth Circuit saw consent based on what it
believed consent to look like-in a free environment with gender equali-
ty, consent means voluntary permission. Based on Graham's behavior,
the court understood that she voluntarily granted permission to Jefferies
and Mendez. However, in prison, behavior that looks like consent is not
the product of free will; rather, it is the result of a situational power im-
138. Id. at 632-33.
139. Lobozzo, 429 F. App'x at 708-09.
140. M. Jackson Jones, Power, Control, Cigarettes, and Gum: Whether an Inmate's Consent o
Engage in a Relationship with a Correctional Officer Can be a Defense to the Inmate's Allegation of
a Civil Rights Violation Under the Eighth Amendment, 19 SUFFOLK 1. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 275,
283 (2014).
141. Lobozzo, 429 F. App'x at 711.
142. Jones, supra note 116, at 288. To establish the subjective element was met, Lobozzo
presented statistics on rapes that occur at Colorado Department of Corrections facilities, claiming
that those statistics provided notice of the danger prisoners face. Id. (citing Lobozzo, 429 F. App'x at
711). The court reasoned that the statistics did not provide the officials with notice that Lobozzo's
constitutional rights had been violated and stated "[tihe record simply does not support her allega-
tions that the CDOC Defendants knew of and disregarded an excessive risk that she would be sex-
ually victimized." Lobozzo, 429 F. App'x at 713.
143. See Lobozzo, 429 F. App'x at 711.
144. See infra Part II.B.
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balance.145 Unlike the Lobozzo court, the Graham court disregarded this
fact because Graham's behavior satisfied its understanding of what con-
sent looks like. As a result, the Graham court declared that Lobozzo did
not apply and took Graham as an opportunity to revisit this contentious
subject.
3. The Tenth Circuit's Dismissal of Cases Involving Sexual Con-
duct in Prison
While reaching its conclusion in Graham, the Tenth Circuit con-
ducted a brief and cursory survey of case law from various jurisdictions.
Though the court mentioned the Sixth and Eighth Circuits' holdings in
Hall and Freitas that consensual intercourse could not constitute an
Eighth Amendment violation, neither case explicitly involved inter-
course.146 The court then moved to a brief discussion of two district court
cases, Cash and Carrigan, which held that consent is not a defense for
guards having sexual contact with inmates. 147
Both Hall 48 and Freitasl49 held that consensual intercourse was not
a constitutional violation.15 0  While the Eighth Circuit in Freitas ex-
plained in dicta that "welcome and voluntary sexual interac-
tions . . . cannot as a matter of law constitute 'pain' as contemplated by
the Eighth Amendment,"5 1 the Tenth Circuit's reliance on both Hall and
Freitas is misplaced, as neither decision explicitly discussed inter-
course.152 Instead, both cases deal with romantic relationships between
guards and inmates-while the Sixth Circuit's decision in Hall refer-
ences a "sexual relationship,"l53 the Freitas opinion discusses a nonsexu-
al relationship. 154 Though the Tenth Circuit cited both opinions as in-
stances in which other circuits reviewed consensual intercourse between
prison guards and inmates, neither case involved a claim that rose be-
yond sexual harassment.5 5
The Graham decision also cited three lower court cases that found
prison guards have no consent defense. 5 6 The court began by citing Cash
145. See infra Part I.C for a discussion on how the social hierarchy in prison impacts inmate
behavior.
146. See notes 117-18 and accompanying text.
147. See notes 119-22 and accompanying text.
148. No. 98-3803, 1999 WL 1045694 (6th Cir. Nov. 8, 1999).
149. 109 F.3d 1335 (8th Cir. 1997).
150. Graham, 741 F.3d at 1124.
151. Id. at 1124 (quoting Freitas, 109 F.3d at 1339) (internal quotation mark omitted); see also
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (plurality opinion) (explaining that the Eighth Amend-
ment forbids excessive punishment that involves "the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" or
is "grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime").
152. Jones, supra note 116, at 285-88.
153. Hall v. Beavin, No. 98-3803, 1999 WL 1045694, at *1 (6th Cir. Nov. 8, 1999).
154. See id. at 285.
155. Id. at 285-87.
156. Id.
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v. County of Erie,'5 7 in which the United States District Court for the
Western District of New York relied on state law to determine that an
inmate lacked the ability to consent to intercourse.'58 Similarly, the Gra-
ham court then turned to Carrigan v. Davis,159 in which the United States
District Court for the District of Delaware looked to state law to deter-
mine that any sexual act between an inmate and a prison guard is a per se
violation of the Eighth Amendment, regardless of consent.'60
While the Tenth Circuit rightfully considered cases that found in-
mates cannot provide consent, the problem with both Cash and Carrigan
is that the courts' decision in each is reflective of local, state laws. In
citing these two cases with little analysis, the Tenth Circuit failed to clar-
ify how these two cases that were based in state laws applied to Gra-
ham's constitutional claim. Because the Graham court saw evidence of
consent in Graham's behavior, it declined to seriously consider any case
law that held that prisoners are not able to consent to sexual activity.161
Moreover, the court failed to consider why other courts, such as the
Ninth Circuit, deem consent between a guard and inmate virtually im-
possible to distinguish from coercion.'6 2
The Tenth Circuit finally reviewed the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Wood v. Beauclairl63 for creating "a rebuttable presumption of noncon-
sent."'1" In Wood, the plaintiff was a male inmate who engaged in a ro-
mantic but nonsexual relationship with Martin, a female guard, and later
filed a claim alleging an Eighth Amendment violation for sexual harass-
ment.165 In determining whether Wood could consent to his relationship
with Martin, the Ninth Circuit thoroughly addressed whether prisoners
are capable of giving consent, citing the lack of control prisoners have
over most aspects of their life' and the resulting power dynamics.
157. Cash is a district court case in which the plaintiff claimed she was assaulted and raped as
a pretrial detainee. Cash v. Cnty. of Erie, No. 04-CV-0182-JTC(JJM), 2009 WL 3199558, at *1
(W.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2009).
158. "Because plaintiff was incarcerated, she lacked the ability to consent to engage in sexual
intercourse with Hamilton as a matter of law. Thus, even if Hamilton's defense was that the sexual
intercourse with plaintiff was physically consensual, this may also constitute a constitutional viola-
tion." Id at *2 (citation omitted) (citing N.Y. Penal Law § 130.05(3)(f)).
159. Carrigan is another district court case in which the plaintiff was an inmate and alleged
that the defendant, Davis, sexually assaulted her in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Carrigan v.
Davis, 70 F. Supp. 2d 448, 454 (D. Del. 1999).
I60. Id. at 453.
161. See supra Part Ill.A.2.
162. See Graham v. Sheriffof Logan Cnty., 741 F.3d 1118, 1124-25 (10th Cir. 2013); Wood v.
Beauclair, 692 F.3d 1041, 1047 (9th Cir. 2012).
163. 692 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2012).
164. Graham, 741 F.3d at 1125 (reviewing Wood, 692 F.3d 1041).
165. Jones, supra note I16, at 289-90.
166. "They cannot choose what or when to eat, whether to turn the lights on or off, where to
go, and what to do. They depend on prison employees for basic necessities, contact with their chil-
dren, health care, and protection from other inmates." Wood, 692 F.3d at 1047.
167. A prisoner's ability to exercise free consent is inherently hindered by the power imbalance
in prison. Id. ("The power dynamics between prisoners and guards make it difficult to discern con-
sent from coercion. Even if the prisoner concedes that the sexual relationship is 'voluntary,' because
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The Ninth Circuit therefore held a presumption of nonconsent for prison-
ers alleging sexual abuse by a guard.16 8
Though the Tenth Circuit mentioned the Ninth Circuit's "middle
ground approach" in Wood, it failed to analyze the effect of the Wood
holding in Graham. Had the Tenth Circuit relied on Wood, it would have
given more consideration to whether Graham could actually consent as a
prisoner, rather than focusing on how she gave consent as a woman.
Moreover, the Graham court did not reconcile Graham's behavior as an
inmate lacking basic freedoms and control over her life, and their im-
pression of Graham as a woman, exercising control over her wants and
desires by flirting and writing notes. Beyond the court's shallow consid-
eration of related cases, the Tenth Circuit's focus on consent detracted
from its consideration of the use of force in Graham's claim.
By failing to adequately consider related case law, the Tenth Circuit
improperly neglected legal precedent. In reviewing Graham's claim, the
court concentrated on whether Graham consented to sex, rather than
scrutinizing if or how she experienced coercion. As the next section will
show, gender inequality can function as coercion, and though traditional
rape law often overlooks it, it is crucial to consider in the prison setting.
B. The Court's Misguided Understanding of "Coercion" in Rape Law
When considering rape in a criminal context, most courts require
proof that there was coercion-that the threat of force or force itself re-
sulted in penetration.169 In adjudicating whether coercion occurred, sev-
eral courts look to the victim's behavior and the extent to which the vic-
tim resisted the force, maintaining that the victim ought to have dis-
played physical resistance.170 By requiring physical resistance, certain
types of coercion are not evaluated in criminal rape cases.
Very rarely have courts acknowledged that rape victims may be so
overcome with fear, that their actions failed to resist the use of force
against them or that there may be other explanations for a failure to
struggle against the offender.172 This Subpart begins by scrutinizing how
the Graham decision examined the question of coercion when evaluating
the excessive force claim and continues to consider dominance theory's
sex is often traded for favors (more phone privileges or increased contact with children) or 'luxuries'
(shampoo, gum, cigarettes), it is difficult to characterize sexual relationships in prison as truly the
product of free choice.")
168. Id. at 1049.
169. LEVIT & VERCHICK, supra note 5, at 182; see, e.g., United States v. Youngman, 481 F.3d
1015, 1020 (8th Cir. 2007); Miles v. Yates, No. CV 05-5459 DOC(JC), 2010 WL 2569190, at *7
(C.D. Cal. May 6, 2010); Leyja v. Oklahoma, No. ClV-09-265-W, 2010 WL 1881462, at *15
(W.D. Okla. Apr. 7, 2010); Williams v. State, 10 So. 3d 1083, 1086 (Ala. Crim. App. 2008); State v.
Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 545 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
170. LEVIT & VERCHICK, supra note 5, at 183.
171. Id at 182.
172. Id at 183.
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arguments of how coercion occurs beyond what criminal rape law de-
fines.173 While reflecting on Graham's testimony and trial court records,
this Subpart shows that, regardless of a cognizable criminal or constitu-
tional claim, Graham experienced coercion based on the view that ine-
quality constitutes force.
In reviewing a rape claim and the issue of a woman's consent, the
legal system will often categorize a woman based on her relationship
with the offender.1 74 For instance, if a woman claims nonconsensual sex
with a stranger, the law puts her into a category in which the lack of a
relationship to the stranger means that, most likely, she was raped. For
Graham, the court considered evidence of her prior interactions with
Jefferies to indicate that she had consented to the sexual activity with
both Jefferies and Mendez.175 Yet when a court assumes that a woman's
relationship to a man can evidence her consent, it overlooks the reasons
why she may not display resistance during intercourse or rape.
The Tenth Circuit's discussion of coercion in the crime of rape is
limited at best in the Graham opinion. Instead of discussing how Graham
may have been coerced, the court only stated that some form of coercion
is required to constitute an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim.
176
The court simply focused on what it believed to evidence Graham's con-
sent and relied on her admission that she was not "forced or given any
promises." By mainly focusing on Graham's behavior and lack of re-
sistance, the court concluded that the sexual activity was not coercive,
and ended its analysis.
When a court only asks whether consent occurred, it fails to consid-
er that inequality between the parties may prevent a woman from dis-
playing her nonconsent.178 When inequality is a reflection of power dy-
namics, its existence between the offender and the victim can constitute
coercion because such inequality prevents the victim from displaying
nonconsent.179 A woman may be "too surprised or too terrified or too
learned in passivity or wants to get it over with too badly" to resist
force. 180
173. This analysis will rely on Catharine MacKinnon's analysis, as her writings and research
have brought the concerns of dominance theory into discussions of legal reform.
174. MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 175.
175. In the Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation (OSBI) interview with Graham, she stated
that the sex was consensual with Jefferies; "I didn't really want Mendez there." Graham v. Sheriff of
Logan Cnty., 741 F.3d 1118, 1122 (10th Cir. 2013).
176. See Graham, 741 F.3d at 1123.
177. Id. at 1122.
178. MAcKINNON, supra note 3, at 247 ("[S]ex under conditions of inequality can look con-
sensual when it is not wanted .... Men in positions of power over women can thus secure sex that
looks, even is, consensual without that sex ever being wanted, without it being freely chosen ....
179. Id.
180. MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 35.
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There is no doubt that the inherent power imbalance of the prison
environment fostered the inequality between Graham, Jefferies, and
Mendez. Graham was a prisoner; she had very little agency, with no con-
trol over what she ate for dinner, what time she went to bed at night, or
any other basic need. Both Jefferies and Mendez were prison guards. The
severe inequality was undoubtedly apparent to all parties, evidenced by
the lack of control Graham had over basic aspects of her life and the
complete control Jefferies and Mendez, as prison guards, retained over
her life.18' Graham was clearly cognizant of her unequal status, as she
testified "her rights were taken from her when she was incarcerated" and
"[s]he had no control over [the sexual activity]." 82 Had the court recog-
nized that power inequality is a form of coercion, it would have found
that coercion occurred because a lack of power prevented Graham from
displaying her nonconsent.
Moreover, Graham's medical records and notes from her counseling
sessions show that Graham had been in a similar position before-a posi-
tion where she was made unequal to her offender and subjected to sexual
acts. As Graham's medical records reflect, "She was molested as a child
by older cousins and an uncle" and "[s]he lived with a very abusive
mother."'83 An expert witness also confirmed "important considerations
for her vulnerability," which included a "mental health history," a diag-
nosis of bipolar disorder, and at least two suicide attempts.184 As a victim
of child molestation, Graham had experienced nonconsensual sexual
contact in her personal relationships. Had it closely considered Graham's
history, the court could evaluate the reasons for her failure to resist and
physically struggle against Jefferies and Mendez. Such a review may
have shown that, to Graham, "force" was not only limited to physical
violence, but also included the exercise of sexual dominance over her.185
As dominance theorists note, most existing criminal laws treat pas-
sive silence, acquiescence, or resigning to sex as consent.'86 Both crimi-
nal and constitutional laws regarding rape fail to recognize reasons why
Graham did not fight against Mendez or Jefferies, and fail to consider
that the power imbalance between them may have been one of those rea-
sons.187 Among the reasons Graham may have submitted to the sexual
181. Appellant's Opening Brief, supra, note 78, at 23-24 (discussing DeShaney v. Winnebago
Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989), which stated: "[W]hen the State by the affirm-
ative exercise of its power so restrains an individual's liberty that it renders him unable to care for
himself, and at the same time fails to provide for his basic human needs-e.g., food, clothing, shel-
ter, medical care, and reasonable safety-it transgresses the substantive limits on state action set by
the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause").
182. Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 78, at 3.
183. Id. at 4.
184. Id. at 13.
185. SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 52.
186. MACKINNON, supra note 3, at 243.
187. There may be speculation that Graham and Jefferies's behavior indicated a genuine inter-
est and connection between them. Unfortunately, a genuine connection amidst the institutionalized
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activity, there may have been intimidation or pressure associated with
Jefferies and Mendez's status and authority.'88 Yet criminal rape law ig-
nores power relationships that may influence the sexual encounter, just
as it ignores nonviolent coercion.189 Evaluations of rape in prison as ex-
cessive force take the same approach, likewise ignoring nonviolent coer-
cion.
By failing to consider if or why Graham did not verbalize or show
her nonconsent, the court implicitly decided that Graham's lack of physi-
cal resistance meant there was no coercion on the part of Jefferies and
Mendez. According to most courts, intercourse is not a crime unless it
includes force that amounts to physical injury.' 9 0 As dominance theory
seeks to show, sex is often nonconsensual, but the narrow requirements
of rape hide the reality of many factors that prevent a victim from exhib-
iting nonconsent.
C. Commoditizing Sexuality in Prison: How and Why
In prison, a guard's extreme control contributes to his power over
inmates and leaves inmates to control just one tangible good: their bod-
ies.191 As a result, women in prison use their bodies and sex as a com-
modity to exert some level of power, and evidence of Graham's behavior
suggests she may have done the same. In addition, having received no
"special treatment" from Jefferies or Mendez, Graham may exemplify
non-tangible benefits inmates may receive for sexual contact with
guards.'
92
It is possible that women prisoners are so used to being oppressed in
past relationships and are so desperate for attention and love, that they
hierarchy is illusory, and an inmate's romance puts her at risk for exploitation. Dirks, supra note 20,
at 110 (citing Agnes L. Baro, Spheres of Consent: An Analysis of the Sexual Abuse and Sexual
Exploitation of Women Incarcerated in the State ofHawaii, 8 WOMEN & CRIM. JUST. 61, 78 (1997);
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 20) ("Arguing that cases of sexual misconduct that involve
'romance' or some level of consensual contact are too difficult to prosecute, those in the legal arena
choose to do nothing to aid women who have been exploited or abused by male prison staff.").
"These legal standards also attempt to jeopardize women's victim status by stigmatizing them as
'inmates' or 'bad girls,' thus occluding any opportunity for their experiences to fall under the pur-
view of 'real rape."' Id. (citing SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE: HOW THE LEGAL SYSTEM VICTIMIZES
WOMEN WHO SAY NO (1987); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the
State. Toward a Feminist Jurisprudence, in VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: THE BLOODY FOOTPRINTS
201 (Pauline B. Bart & Eileen Geil Moran eds., 1993)).
188. SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 52.
189. Id. at 59.
190. Id. at 71; see also MACKINNON, supra note 3, at 247 ("If force were defined to include
inequalities of power, meaning social hierarchies, and consent were replaced with a welcomeness
standard, the law of rape would begin to approximate the reality of forced and unwanted sex.").
191. Amy Laderberg, Note, The "Dirty Little Secret": Why Class Actions Have Emerged as
the Only Viable Option for Women Inmates Attempting to Satisfy the Subjective Prong of the Eighth
Amendment in Suits for Custodial Sexual Abuse, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 323, 340-41 (1998).
192. While Graham received a candy bar and a blanket, the Tenth Circuit stated she did not get
"special treatment." See Graham v. Sheriff of Logan Cnty., 741 F.3d 1118, 1120-21 (10th Cir.
2013).
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are used to exchanging their bodies for attention.'93 While in prison,
women tend to respond to male authority the same way they did before
their incarceration.194 A review of Graham's medical records shows that
this may have been her own circumstance; not only was she molested
and abused as a child, but she also married at fifteen years old.' 95 This
suggests she experienced oppression and abuse in her past relationships
and may have believed that she needed to exchange her body for a sense
of protection or attention.
Another explanation of why sex is commoditized in prison is be-
cause of the prisoner's own self-esteem.196 Some inmates seek relation-
ships with guards because of loneliness or as a way to pass time. 197 In
Graham, the plaintiff testified that she felt "wanted and appreciated"
when the defendant asked to see her naked.'98 She also testified that ex-
changing flirtatious notes with the guards was enjoyable and gave her
something to do.199 This demonstrates that, despite the circumstances,
Graham found a way to get something else she needed through sex: self-
200esteem. Women inmates are often unable to envision positive out-
comes for themselves because of their powerlessness and the hopeless-
ness of their situation;201 thus, receiving attention from a guard can make
202
a prisoner feel some self-worth.
When a woman inmate uses her body to get what she needs-
whether it is protection, safety, a piece of candy, or a fraction of confi-
dence-she has not consented to sex. Prison creates an environment of
coercion, and women are objectified not only because they are women,
but further by virtue of their role as powerless inmates. Prisoners are
deemed to lack entitlement to the rights accorded to ordinary citizens;
they are deprived of their freedom to make choices or grant permis-
203
sion. A lack of these basic freedoms includes lacking the capability to
consent to intercourse.
193. See Laderberg, supra note 189, at 339-40.
194. Id
195. Appellant's Appendix at 68, Graham v. Sheriff of Logan Cnty., 741 F.3d 1118 (10th Cir.
2013) (No 12-6302) (reproducing Stacey Graham's medical records).
196. Buchanan, supra note 28, at 56.
197. Id ("For some women, 'it seems as if sex is the only thing that keeps time clicking by."'
(quoting CRISTINA RATHBONE, A WORLD APART: WOMEN, PRISON, AND LIFE BEHIND BARS 49
(2005)).
198. Graham, 741 F.3d at 1121.
199. Id.
200. Interacting with the guards likely contributed to Graham's sense of self-worth because she
was engaged and received attention from them. Note that acts to build self-esteem are not synony-
mous to consenting to a particular sexual act, though Graham may have ngaged in sexual contact
because self-worth depended on a need to feel desired.
201. Laderberg, supra note 191, at 339-40.
202. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 20.
203. Deborah Labelle, Bringing Human Rights Home to the World of Detention, 40 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 79, 83 (2008).
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CONCLUSION
When it determined that Graham consented to sex, the Tenth Circuit
failed on several counts. First, the court misapplied the law. The Tenth
Circuit was charged with evaluating an excessive force claim; but in re-
viewing Graham's claim the court neglected to evaluate excessive force;
instead, it concentrated on Graham's consent.
Second, the court's review of Graham's consent was improper be-
cause the court focused only on Graham's behavior rather than consider-
ing her circumstances as a prisoner and the coercion she faced. As domi-
nance theory reveals, the court used a patriarchal view of rape and con-
sent. Its opinion overlooks how gender inequality results in coercion,
especially in prison where women inmates are utterly powerless and in-
capable of consenting at all, and suggests that Graham invited the sexual
conduct that was the basis of her claim.
Third, the court demonstrated the common disregard for both gen-
der and social inequality when it placed the blame on Graham. The court
did not give her status as a woman equal consideration or acknowledge
how her status as a prisoner affected her behavior. Both existing criminal
rape laws and courts evaluating rape as an excessive force claim ignore
the power relationships that influence sexual encounters in prison. As a
result of the power imbalance, inmates use their bodies as a commodity
to experience control.Graham presents several challenges women pris-
oners face in the justice system-the limited definition of rape in crimi-
nal law, the inability to overcome institutionalized male dominance, and
the struggle to assert control when all other personal rights have been
restricted. Courts reviewing rape in prison under the Eighth Amendment
must take a holistic and concentrated approach to the unique circum-
stances of the parties. A vital component to justice for prisoners depends
on a comprehensive understanding of their plight. In order for women
prisoners to gain autonomy and justice in the legal system, courts must
come to terms with how prisons create an environment that interrupts
how relationships are constructed. If a court tailors its analysis and opin-
ion to fully acknowledge the experience of prisoners, women like Stacey
Graham will have an opportunity for equality and justice in the legal
system.
Kristen Seddiqui*
* J.D. Candidate, 2017. My heartfelt thanks go to the Denver University Law Review Board
for the insight, contributions, and guidance that shaped this writing and made it publishable. I also
give thanks to my family for the constant support and encouragement; and, above all, to Daniel for
patiently believing in me.
[Vol. 92:3696
